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Mastering. ~olshevism 
C OMRADES, it can be seen from the discussion on them at the, Plenum that 
ing here with the follow three basic facts: 
First, the wrecking and diversive spying 
agents of foreign countries, among whom the Trotsky- ' 
it= played an active enough role, affected .to some degwe 
or other all or almost all our organizations, both em- 
nomic, administrative and Party. 
Second, the agents of foreign countries among the 
Trotskyites penetrated not only into the lower organiza- 
tions but also into some responsible positions. 
Third, some of our leading comradts, both in h e  
center and in the localities, were not only unable to 
- 
r,ecognize the real faces of these- wreckers, diversionists, 
spies and murderers, but they were so mxeIess, comph: 
cent and naive that not infrequently they themselv~ as- 
sisted the agents of foreign powers to get into Various 
responsible positions. 
These are three indisputable £acts which naturally 
arise from the reports and the discussion on them. 
1 : Political Carelessness 
H OW a n  it  be explained that our lading comradesb who have a rich experience of struggle againat every 
kind of anti-Party and anti-Soviet trend, proved to k rn 
blind and naive in this case that they were unable to 
recognize the real face of the enemies of the people, were 
unable to discern the wolves in sheep's clothing, were 
unable to tear the mask from them? 
Can it be stated that the wrecking- and diversiod- 
spying-work of the agents of foreign p w e n  who were - 
busy on the territory of the U.S.S.R. could be something 
unexpected and unprecedented for us? No, this =ot ' 
9 
- 
. .  . * - 
4 
. . 3 
-I .:& && =' b &own by The wrecking aca in variou .L 
~ d ; k a f ' r n ~ ~ y  during the past ten years, -' 
-- ataqhg with the S U t y  period, -which are set out in - ' 
. i q b I d '  ta I 
Can it be stated that we have lately had no warning ' 
' d @  aud fo, d i r d w s  about tbe d i n g ,  .: 
: spying or =Litity of h e  Trots~,yite-Zine - 
vievite agents of fw&m? No, this cannot k s t a d  There' - 
were such signah,. and Bolsheviks have no right. to forget : 
them. 
The foul murder of Comrade h v  was the h i t  seti- 
, our warning showing that tbe enemies of the people will 
. . pr++ce duplicity and, in doing so, will disgaise e r n - .  
selves as &lshwiks, as Party members, a. @-.ypm ' 
Wr.way,intoour~&mceandqxnapthforthem- . wzw iatb wr 
~ h c  trial of -1' l i ~ e  the &-: - 
. ~ w ~ ~ n ~ ~ a u n ~ t i o n $ f d r t b e I ~ ~ '  . 
-sFising from the fact of the Eoul murder of Cm&e 
- b . -. 
The trial of the "Zinoviw-Trotskyite bloc" atmded - -  
the lessqns of @e previous &la, p W y  showing that x O !  
-the Zinov*vites and Trocslrgita unite M u n d ~ 1 v e s  1 
W e  must put *n end to o p p r t ~  complacency admg - 
from tlg rmetalcen prwup tion hat in proportion to tr the growth of our f o m  e enemy will gmw ever tamer , 
aad more inoffensive. Such a presupposition is basieall 
wow. ~t is a IA* of h e  sight devutim, vh*h ud 
everyone that the enem& would quid creep into 
wcia~ism, that in the long w ih w o d b e # , m e  r r ~  
sodaMs.  It is not the burinas of 31 e Bohhm'ks U, -mt 
on their Iaurels and stand around ping. It ia not m- 
pkmcy that we need but a c e ,  real 
revolutronary vigilmm. It must be 
more desperate the position of ,the e d e s ,  the more 
willing Ngr will be to seize on mtteme mares ,  as the 
only measum of doomed people in heir s-le against 
Soviet power. We must remembm this and be vigilanr, 
h the dosed letter d July 49, 1936, regarding the 
spying .and 6 r i s t i c  activity of the Trotskyite-Zinoviev- 
ite Mock, the C e n d  Committee of the C.P.S.U. called-on 
the Party -orpimion to show the d u r n  vigilance, 
to be able to -ize the enemies of thk peop1e.m 
matter how well nhsked. It says in the closed Lerter: 
Now when it haa hen proved that the Trotskyite . 
Zinovievite scum unite all the moat :bitter and s w c m  
t 
Parry hro an.impregnable f o r m  into w h i d  not a 
-le doubfqdeakr could penetrate. :! 
They d e d  for putting a stop to the undemtimation , 
of Party politid work and making a resolute turn 
in the direction of strengthening such work to the '' 
oramat, in the direction of strengthening political 
b ~~. 
And what happened? The facts have shown that our - 
mmradts tmk in these signals and warnin@ with more 
than s t i f i s  
. This ia eloquently shown by all the facts which y e  
%now from the sphere of the campaign for verifying and 
exchanging Party documents. 
How a n  it be explained that these warnings and 
sipah did not produce the proper action? How can it 
be explained that aur Party c o d  in spite of their ~~ of. muggle against antiMet elements; in 
spite'of a whole seria of warning signals and forewarn- 
ing directives, proved to be politically shortsighted in the - 
hce Of the wrecking and spying diversive work of the 
enemies of the pmple? 
. Is it that our Party comrades have b m e  worse than . 
they were before, have become less d e n t i o u s  and . 
disdplided? No, of course not. 
Is it that they have begun w degenerate? Again, no. . Su& a suppushion is completely mbnd& 
Then, what is the mattqr? 'arhm such gaphg, . 5 
a r e h e a s ,  complacency, blindnd 
The £act is that our PaPtg , mrried away by 
e m n d  campaim and by enormous s u m  on the 
bPnt of economic construction, aimply forgot some very 
important hcts wh* Bolsheviks havt no right to fwget - 
They forgot me hdammtal fact from the sphere of 
the podtion of the U.SS.R* and did ribt 
notice- fwo m' im-t facts which apply d i d y  to 
6 
, aheI.tdng bdrind the Party ad. and- 
B o W ~  
2:  Capitalist Encirclement , 
- 
W HAT are these facts which our Party f~rgot, or w W  they simply did not notice? :. * 
They forgot that Soviet power has conquered d y  ' "1: 
onesixth of the world, that 6ve-sixth of @e world is & = 
-ion of capi.talist powers. They hwt Wt the - 1 ;  
Soviet Union ia in the conditions of.capitabt e n a u  , 
~ m t .  It is an accepted thing to talk 1 d y  abut  =pi; -h 
talist encirclement, but p p l e  do nat want to pd& 
. upon what sort oE thing this capitalkt emidemem .k , 
Capitalist eneirdment-+hat ii no empty phase; ,&it 
is a very r d  and u n p b n t  Eeanre. &pita& en- ' 
ment mmm that here is one: muntrg, the Soviet U k ,  
#which hak established the mdaht order on hs own 
tory ahd h i d &  this there are many muntries, born- 
@s countria, which continue to mry on a apbU 
mode of life and which s m u n d  the Soviet Uniarg Mt-- 
ing for an opportunity to attack it, breab it, or at any T&! 
to utldermine its power and waken i t  
- . Our. c o d e s  forgot this fufi-ma fact. Bat k hj 
-&at pmi8ely w w  datemks the Esaeis of relations be- 
tween the capitnlist ~~t and the S h e t  U n k  
Take 501: example the 'bou~geois ram. S i m p l e ~ d d  --: 
p $ e  may think tbat e e l y  4 whtians - 
bemeen them, as betwedn stam of ttte samk qpei But 
only simple-minded people am think sa In redby tgE 
relatiom hetween them are Ear horn being thm of-p$  . ' 
neighbors. I t  b ken proved as plainly as two zind :e> ' ' 
make four that the bouqpis fitam thowet th& rip& , --.. 
, - wretkmx, divenionhrs and mmetimes madems on .a J,:' 
.other, behind their frontiers; @vq &em hmmmm . .- I - . - 
worm thenisclva the W e d  'gtld in&hW&-s--' 
7 . . 
- 
_ .  - C ' 
to qate,th&.ovn mtwmk there pnd "ii -. 
'm rrrmb thcm fFom the nir lo;,au :- 
uactamine tixit power. such L th 
, b e  at * pment time. 
- - : - .  B t d ,  too, has bee21 thecase in thk p't. Take hx , 
c- 
* ,  -- the mammies ci£ Europe at .&, ti- of Napleoa 
-:"&c Pint. F- at &at rimo was maming with +a0 
: :. d. d i e d s t a  horn tht camp d &e R d a m ,  Gcr- -: p m , . A  usmi& , a d  English. And, at the dme, A 
&gland, the ' German A~tria; and Russia bad 
_behind their liua rw fewer spies .md d i d o n b t s  from 
the French m p .  A p t s  of Frat B r i h  mice made 
I ' d  
, attempts on. Chc me of Naplea ,  and gevgeveral '* 
a ~ _ ~ t h e p c ; l s s n t 5 0 f t h c v e n d e e i n F % a r l c e * t  . 
'. the governmmt of Napoleon. And what was Napleon's 
pwmmat? A bourgeak govemmmt wbich had 
,, " . - agigled the h c h  Revolution and retained -1y '& 
of the mvduti~xi which were profitable tr, the 
- ,- big bourgeoisie. Needless to say, Napolccm's g o v e k t  . . - &'not &n.hdebted to itj Gebors, It also &- .: 
- '@It its own divenioxd m m .  Such was the Xn 
h past, I80 yam ago.. Such is the now, 130 F, .- Napoldon the First. France and England at the 
6. .\ 
3 .pgent day are with Caman spies and diver- T, 
: ,  '~WSES and, on the other hand, An@aFrm& spies and 3 
- . dy&sionisaa * ip .nun. are at work in Wmfiny, A- 2% 
with Ja- ~ i e a  d diwmimisg 
t * t b r ~ ~ O f ~ ~ , , b n w a n * ~ n ~ e r  
- '  % @ i ~ 6 * ~ t b r ; p e t : w h y & a q ~ t h e ~  - 
- ~~H $nd mwe r,&ghl&i to &he'- 
W d h t ~ t b a n , & ~ a P e ~ ~ i s s ~ o l - ~  
- W r m ~ ? W h ' p b h o u ? d t b e y s s n 8 . ~ ~ ~ a , d -  
'd, diver60dsb and tn-m k h M  the b t i e m  J 
, raC Met Union &n the mad Mid tlq h n k '  . 
&+buq@ countria-which are akin@:*? . - 
8 
.-, . 
did you get this frpm? Will it not be m r ,  h n  the - 
. pint of view of Makbm, to suppose that the - . stam must be sending' mi'& or three, the a m y +  
wreckem, spies, diverismists and mudmrs b e h d ' & e  ' 
lines of the Soviet Union than bebind those of any . 
bourgeois state? 
Is it not deax that as long as capitalist encirclement 
exists there will be wreckers, 'sp ies,  diversion& and 
murderers in our country, sedt behind our lines by the 
agents of foreign states? 
Our Party mmndcr forgot about all &is, and having - 
forgotten were aught unawam. 
This is why the spying and d i d v e  work of the ... 
Trotskyite agenu of the Japanac and German swret - 
police was completely unexpxted by some of .ow 
comrades. 
1 
3 : Present-Day Trotskyism 
T PROCEED, In mrrping on a s-le against the', - Trotskyite agents, our Party c o d a  did not notice, 
they overlooked the fact, that present-day TrotsItyism is 
no longer what it was, let us say, seven or eight yeam 
agu;. that Trotskyism and the Tratskgitm have p d  
through a serious evolution in this cud wbich has 
~ 1 y ~ t h e f a c e a f T ~ ~ ~ i n v i e w o f  .: 
this the stnrggIp: against Tdyism and the h o d  tif 
struggle against it rust  a h  be u t d y  &an@. Our. 
Party coma& did not. notice that Troakyimn his 
ceased to be a poEticd trad in the working cl-, that , 
it has changed from the political trend in the working 
class which it was amen or eight y e a  ago, into a frank 
and unprhcipIed gang of wreckers, dhmionists, spk 
- and murderers acting on the instnrctipn of the htelli- 
p c e  ~~ bf foreign states; 
What is a politid trend in the working class? A @ti. 
9 
.> * 
+I trendin-the workinghisagroupora party which 
.+, awn dehite politid h e ,  platform and program. 
. 'which docs not and m o t  hide ita views from the work- . 
ing class but, on the mnmry, o p d y  and honeatly d e g  
an propaganda for its views in full view of the working 
c h ,  does not fear to show its plitiml face to the work- 
. iplg class, doeg not fear to demonstrate its real aims and 
taslrs to the working class but, on the cuntra~p, $oes to 
a the working class with open visor to convince it  of the 
, curnuless of its views. In the past, seven or eight yeanr 
ago, Tmtskyism was one of su& politid urea& in the 
working c h ,  an anti-Leninist trend, it is m e ,  and 
thedore p r o b ~ y  mistaken, but nevertheless a po- 
kid trend. 
Can it be said that present-day Tmtakpism, the 1936 
Trotskyism, let us say, is a politid trend in the working 
die present- 
real hce to the 
their real aims and 
thdr politid face from 
the working h a  should 
propaganda of ita 
but the masking of 
for the views of its 
trampling of its own 
V h l  in the dirr. . . 
If you replcmk, lbmnw and Zinoviev at the trial 
in 1936 strmuady denied tbat they had any politid A 
@b. Xt was fully possible £or them to develop their - . 
@ti@ pWbm at the 'trial. But they did not do so, ' 
c&Mng that they had no politid platfarm. There can 1 
be no doubt thai both af them w m  lying when they 
denied that they b d  a platform. Even blind a n  .?? 
10 - -1 
. ', 
1 
that ,such a platform would 4Ek 
working c h .  
At the trial in 1937, Piatakov, Radek and S d o W v  
twk a different line. They did not deny that the Tbt -  
skyitesi and Zinovicviteg had a political platform. They 
admitted h t  thG had a d a t e  politiml platform, 
recognized and unfolded it in their testimony. But f h q  
unfolded it not to call on the working &, not to d 
oh the people to m p p t  the Trotskyite pladorm, but 
in order to curse it and b m d  it as an anti-people's anb 
anti-proletarian platform. 
The restoration of capitalism, the liquidation of dw 
collective farms and state farms, @e restoration of the 
system ot exploitation, an alliance with the hcbt  facts 
of Germany and Japan to bring war agaht the W e t  
Union nearer, a struggle for war and aminat the policy 
of peace, ihe redtorial d i s m e m h w t  a£ the Sovier 
Union,. giving the Ukraine to the Gemnab and the 
maritime provinces to the Japanese, the prtparation of 
the military defeat of the Soviet Union if memy h t e 9  
should attack it, and, as a means of achiwing theae tasks, 
wrecking, diversion, individual mmism agaimt the, 
leaden of the Soviet government, espionage for the bene 
tit of the Japanese and Genman fascist bxa+u& nras 
the politid platform of present-day Trotskyism which 
WM set forth by P i a t a h ,  Radek and StkoMkov. 
Naturally the Trotskyite could not but hide such a 
platform b m  tbe people, from the working clam. Apd 
they hid it not only from the working but &I$. 
Erom the Trotskyite mnk and 6le, and not only fnp  ,& 
Trowltyite rank and Me but wen hmn the ldhgwf 
11 
? - _  ilre w m k i q  dPII but a gang without principle. without 
ij! -iib,. d wmckm, divmionisw, h d l & p c e  amla 
--,.!,'- s p i a  murderers,a&of  of the 
&->--qb$hg dnss, war* in the pap *f the inteIli8"cc )?: ~ ~ f ~ p ~  I .  
,, -- + S t i  is tttc hdhputable d r  of the evolution af. 
: ~ ~ i n t h c ~ ~ ~ ( ' ~ ~ ~ e ~ t ~  
- & u c 5 r i s ~ ~ ~ ~ p i s m i n t h e ' ~ ~  
surPea into highway *baa, tap- 
~ ~ o E a H ~ i a ~ ~ - t o  
and *e outright hem* &'their - Ihm the so* gwemmmt 
rcuwma t.baaub'h1W to
the M g i t w ' i n a  S M W ' & ~ ~ &  

This is not so with the presentday wreckers, with tne 
Troeyitm The ~ n t - d a y  wreckers have no t e c h i d  
superiority over our people. O n  the contrary, our people 
are btter mined tebica l ly  than the presient-day 
d m ,  than the Trotskyites. During the time from the 
Shakhty period to our own, days, tena of thousands of 
genuine, tdmimIly strong Bolshevik cadres have grown 
up among us. One could mention thousands and tens of 
thousands of Bolshevik leading @ma technically de- 
veloped in comparison with whom all such people as 
Piatakov and Livshitz, Shestov and bgwlavsky, Mumlov 
and Drobnb are empty windbap and mere tyros from 
the p i n t  of view of technical training. In this aser what 
dms the strength of the present-day wrmkem, the Trot- 
skyita, consist of? Their strength lim in the Party ard, . 
in the passmion of a Party card. This strength Iies in 
the fact that the' Party ard giverp them politiml trust 
and o p  the doors of all our institutions and organ- 
btions to them. 
Their advantage lies in the fact that holding a Party 
cwd and pretending to be friends of the Soviet power 
they tricked our p i l e  politicdly, misused their con- 
fidence, did their wrecking work furtively, and disclosed 
w r  secrets of state to the enemies of the Soviet- Union. 
This "advanrage" is a doubtful one in its political and 
m d  values, but stiII it is an "advantage." This "advizn- 
tage," in d t y ,  explains the ha that the Trotskyite 
wreckers, as people with a Party mrd having access to 
d places in our btihrtions and mpizatiom, were a 
real windfall for the intelligence setvim of foreign states. 
The mistakea of some of oar Party comrades is that they 
did not notice, did not understand all this difEeremc 
between the old and &he new wreckers, between- the 
Shakhty wreckers and the Trotskyites, and not noticing 
this, they were unable to reconstruct themselvm ih time so 
as to wage battle against the new wreckers in a new way. 
14 
4: The Seamy Side of Economic Success 
S UCK are the basic facts from the sphere of our inter- nationd and internal situation, about which many of 
our Party comrades forgot, or which they did not notice: 
This is why our people were taken by surprise by the 
events of the Jast few years as regards wfmkhg and 
diversion. 
I t  may be asked: But why did our people not mtb 
all this, why did thq  forget about all &is? Where did 
alI this Eorgetfulnw, blindness, areIessness and com- 
placency come *om? 
Is it an organic defect in the work of our people? No, 
it L not an organic defect. It is a temporary phenomenon 
which can be rapidly liquidated by some efforts on the 
part of our people. 
Then what is the matter? 
- The matter is that our Party comrades have been 
totally absorbed in economic work in recent years, have 
been engmssed to the limit in m o m i c  successes, and 
being e n g r d  in all these things- forgot about all else, 
threw aside'all else. 
The matter is that being carried away by economic 
successes they began to iegard this as the beginning and 
end of everything, and simply gave up paying attention 
to such thine as the international position of the Soviet 
Union, -pitalist encirclement, strengthening of the 
political work of the Party, struggle against wrecking, 
etc., supping  all t h a e  questions to be second-rate and 
even third-rate matters. 
Succesrres and achievements are. of course, a great 
thing. Our successes in the sphere of socialht consmaion 
are m l y  enormous. 
But s u m e s ,  like everything else under the sun, have 
their seamy side. Among people who are not very skillful , 
in politics big s u m  and big achievements not in& 
'5 
PI: ' --*-. ' , , . . &e-?.*:-. . r 
I. - - - 
; + ; c . : h  * * tkc**hna, compkatcy, ~ l f & m -  
?.': m, mememing seIfanMence, swell-headednw 
. . . azkd M. You m o t  deny that braggarts have htely 
' 
- h e l o @  among us tremendously. It is not starp-g 
' 
im .&be' -circwtanms of big and serious s u c c a ~ ~  in 
, the ern of &t comtnmi~n that feel- .of 
. 4 b m s t f u l ~  are mate& feelings of showy demonsma- 
- ' tioB of our aumtsses, and feeliqp are a e a d  for un- 
daestbating che smm@ of our enemkg feemgs of 
overestimation of our own a-, and as a result df all  
this politid blindnes4 appears. 
-1 must here aay a few words about the dangers COB ~~ with succekws, about the dangers connected with 
- achi&ements. 
-'We know by W e n c e  of the dangers Eonntcted- 
with -ties. For a number of y a m  we have been- 
. figbtIng againat such %in& ;of dangers, and Z must say . 
mt withoyt sumas. Among people who axe not ataunch, 
- connected with difkultia not Xrquently give 
rise to dmnast k b g s ,  distrust in their own h, 
feeline of pessimism h d ,  on. tbe contray, .when it is . - 
r inatter of fighting against the dangers which arise from ' 
df&dties, people are tempered in this- struggle and 
emerge fmm the stmggle really granite Bolshtirih. 
. ' Snch b the nature of the dangers ronrmtceed with dif- 
f idt iw. Sir& are the mula of wewomhg difhdtia. 
But there is another kind of the danger con- 
~ n E & e d t v i i t h ~ s u ~ , ~ e d a n g c r ~ w i & ~ e v e -  
a -Fa, ya,, mmmdts, dangers connected with snc- 
c a m ,  w$tb d , e m n e n ~ .  ']These dangers comiat-in the - - 5 
k t - & a t  mmg ppk  Ettk skilled iq pIItiai and not 
.-4 ha* seen mu& the condition of swmma-8- : + su-, achievement &r achievement, the wtr- 
- f d f b u ~ t  of plans after the overfulilment of plans- ,.. 
- @mi riem feelinga of mreles%nms and df4atishkim. C 
mates an htmoqhere of-showy triumphs and mutual - E - .  , . t 6 ' - L  
. . 
congratulations which kill the ~ I S C  crf pro* a", 
dull political irastincc, take the spring out ofpsbpde d ' 
im$l &em to rat on their laurels. % .  - It b not s u r p r i s i i  that in this narcotic 
of swell-hcadedams and self-satis£action, this 
of showy demonsmations and loud elE-praise, people w- 
get =me essential facts which are of first- sign& 
ante for the fate of our country; people begin to & -- 
wxing such unpleasant faas as tzpitaIist encirclement, . I 
the new £oms of d i n g ,  the dangm connected with 
our ma-, etE, 
Gapitalist enckIement? A mere bagatellel What a- 
nifime can m e  capitalist encirc1'tment or other haw 
if we fulfill and nu- our economic plans? The new 
forms of wrecking, the struggle against Trotskyism? M m  
details1 What signi6cance can all these trifles haw when 
we fum and s w p m  our economic plans? The Party 
statutes, the election of P q  organs, the repdng of tht 
Party leaders to the mass of the Party mem&is there 
really any need for all this? k it worth while worr)ring 
about aII thest m0m at all if our economy grows and the 
material situation of the workers and ~ t s  bmmm 
ever better and better? Mere dcraihl We overfulfil the 
plans, our Parq is not bad, the Central Committee of 
the Party is also nor bad-what else do we need? They 
are funny people sitting there in Mwroow in the Cenml 
C a m i t t e e  of the Party. They invent some kind of que- 
tions, talk about some wrecking or other, don't s l q  
themselves, and don't let otber people sleep. 
This is an example plain to see of how easily and 
'*simply" acme of our i n e x p e r i d  mmrades are in- 
k # d  with politid blindness as the m l t  of a -
rapture in economic succme. 
Such are the & n p  m n n d  with s u m ,  
achievements. 
Such are the m m  why our Paw wmrada a 
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. ried away by economic successes, have forgotten facts of -: 
.am international and internal h c t e r  which are'of real 
importance for the Soviet Union, and have not noticed 
a whole & of dangers surrounding our counuy. 
Such are the m u  of our carelesness, forgetfulness, 
c o m p ~ n c y ,  and political blindneps. 
Such arc the roo& of the shorecomings in our economic 
and Party work. 
5 :  Our Tasks 
H OW are we to liquidate the shortcomings in our work? What must be done in order to do this? 
It is necesmy to carry out the following measures: 
1. First and foremost, the attention of our Party com- 
rades who get bogged on "current quatiom" in one de- 
partment or another must be turned towards the big 
political questions of both international and internal 
character, 
2. The political work of our Party must he misea to 
the proper level, making the main task that of the 
politid training and Bolshevik steeling of the Party, 
Soviet and economic mdxes. 
3. It should be explained to our Party wmrades that 
the economic successes, the significance of which is un- 
doubtedly very p t  and which we shall also striveL 
for in the future, day after day, year after year, are 
nevertheless not the whoIe of our s d d i s t  wmtructicm. 
It should be explained that the seamy sides connected 
with economic s u c m s a  and exp-d in self-satisfaction, 
in carelamess, in the deadening of political intuition, 
can k liquidated only if ecwomic sumam are com- 
bined with the successes of Party construction and the 
developed politid work of our Party. 
It should be explained that economic swcemm them- 
selves, their stability and duration, wholly and fully de- 
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pend on the su- of Party o r p h t h i z t l  and Party 
politial work, that without this condition economic 
succkum may prove to be built on sand. 
4. It should be remembered and never forgotten9that 
as long aa mpitalist encirclmeut exists there will be 
d m ,  diversiom, spies, terroristrr, sent behind the 
Erontim of the Soviet Union by the intelligene services 
of foreign states; thb should be remembered and a smg- 
gle should be &mid on against those corn* who 
underestimate the dpifmme of the fact of capitalist 
encirclement, who underestimate h e  streng$h and sig- 
n i f i m e  of wrekiq. 
It should be explained to our Party comiada that no 
economic su- whaawver, no matter how great they 
are, can annul the fact of -pitalist encirclement and the 
results arising .therefrom. 
The necaary measures must be taken to give our 
comrades, b t h  Party and non-Party Bolsheviks, the prw- 
sibility of getting acquainted with the aims and +, 
with the practice and technique of the wrecking, diver- 
sionist and espionage work of the foreign intelligmce 
senrim. 
5. It should be explained to our Party comrades that 
the Tmtskyim* who repregent the active elements in the 
diversionist, wrddng and espionage work of the Wgn 
- intelligence m i c a C  have already long ceased to be a 
politid mend in the working class, that they have al- 
ready long ceased to sedk any idea compatible with the 
interests of the working dm, that they have turned into 
a gang of wreckers, divmionists, spies, amwins, without 
principles and idas, working for the foreign intelligence - . 
services. 
It should be explained that in the struggle against 
contemporary Tmtjkylirm, not the old methods, thc 
methods of discussion, must be used, but n& hemi 
methda of smashing and uprooting it. 
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was concerned, it waa p k d y  dear that 
e attitude OF Tblsheviks . tbwar&' W M a h  alie 
ads, the failure to 
to h e  pitical deckations they make, but according :&- 
the mulb of the work they ,do. The key quesw now 
facing us is not the liquidation of the technical - ba& . -;$-- 1 wardnas of. our =dm, for in the .main tbis has -9 - -<+ 
betn done, but the liquidation of ihe political cw* - .!: 
neaa and pblitical' uystfulness in wreckers. Who k v e  by 
chance obtained pmesion of Party membmliip d.: 
Such is the fundamental differenee betwnn rhe key ;q 
question in respect to the ' struggle for - ,* j X .  
:. 3 period of the. Shakhty days and the keg question of the G$ 
present *. 
That is why ten years ago we couM and shourd 
have issued both the slogans- together, nmely, the anel=:: 
regarding- the mastery of technique and the one ., -';.- 
ing the politid training of cadre. 
This is  why the old slogan of the-mas- of '2 
- must now be supplemented by the hew slogan, 'd -*I : 
mastery of Bolshevism, the politid trai*, & . 
. ,. . 
. and the liquidation of 'our poIitical m r t l m ~ ,  , . ... -5:; 
: 7. W e  must destroy and cast aside the 
that with eveiy advance we make the c . k  g&q&:-i;-aq 
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g$-!& - - wot;d die down more aad -re, and that in 
&?, &Wtion.a~ we achieve awms the cIass enemy would r . w e  more and mom mctable. 
2 . .. ::T&is is not only a rotten theory but a dmpmw one, 
,! . 6m it lulls our peopIe, leads them into a trap, and makes 
L::. & p d M e  for the class enemy to rally for the stm&le 
%. - against the soviet gmmmen.t. 
, ' On the umtxay, .the further forward we a d m e ,  the 
p t e r  the susuccerwres we achieve, the greater will be the 
hry of the remnants of the broken exploiting h, 
the sooner will they rcsort to dm-per fioPms of suuggle, 
; the more will they seek to harm the Soviet state and the 
more will they clutch at the most &pate  means of 
. struggle, aa the last ~esort of doomed people. e broken It should dimes be in borne the U.S.S.R. in mind are that not the alone, remnants They+-have of the 
the d i m  support of our enemies beyond the boands of 
the U3S.I;  It would be a m b k e  to think that the 
spkere of the class smuggle is limited to the bounds of 
&c u,S.%R. While one end of the class stmgg1e has its 
. ope~atim within the bounds of the US,S.X, ita other 
r-es to the bounds of the bourgeois states s u m d -  
iag w. T h e  remnants of the broken claaPes m o t  but 
' 
be aware of thia And precisely bust they are, they 
I will, conhue their desMte as~aults in the future. 
. This is what history mchm us. This is what Leninism 
m&es ue. 
We must remember all  this and be on ourguard 
8. We must d e s t q  and a t  aside mother rotten 
theory acGoading to wbi& the individual who ia not 
dwap q a g d  in wmkhg and who even txm&aa~~~ 
s h o w s - s m - i n  his war% be a wrecker. 
Thh s m q e  theory eqmw the naivete of i& authors, 
No wrecker will enpge in wmckbg all dong the line 
if he wants to avoid hing aposed in the &ortat p 
ale time. On the contrary, the real &er b;M from 
O t  
time to time to shew s u m s m  'in 
his only y of keeping himelf 
bf w-g the codidmice of people a m i d  
WTeCkhg work. 
I think that this question is clear and 
6rt8er explanation. 
9. W e  must destroy and a t  aside the 
, theory, to the that the spstematic 
economic p h  reduca wrecking and its eo 
to inaught 
Such a theory can ody have one p u v ,  mmeb,, .q, 
titillate the sell-ateem of our departmental &&b,.*#!i 
lull them and to weaken their struggle against 
What is the meaning of "the. sptematic fulfillment 
our economic plans?" - - 1  
First, it has bien pmved that all our e m n d  &. 
are below norma1 becaw they do not take .-uruL8-g 
the tremendous reserves and pcwsibilitia lying hid&&!- 
in our national economy. 
Second, the general ful 
by the commissariats as a 
plans are a h  fulfilled by 
On the conmy, the Eacts 
not been e x p a d  and thrown out,. 
spcct to the fulfil 
ken far worse. 
authors of the 
. Fourth, the -ern ZESW 
their d i n g  work not to 
to that of the eve of war or of 
ta la11 oumeIves with the 
'-2%. -7-n. - - - - . .- F . - -  - . . ,. 7,g 
, .- - .-- 
o f t t r s ~ o m i c p ~ a n d m a s t . t o t o u e h . , ~  is 
~&n. Do the authors of 'this rotten Wry i p p  . 4 
-ame what P tremendous amount of harm the wreckers . - - + =  -*? . . W u ~ d d o t o ' o u r r n ~ i n ~ e o f w a r , i f ~ ~ t o  :..A 
, a b w  them to remain inside the body of our national . t n  
m o m y ,  sheltered by the rotten theory of "the system- . s 
& fulfillment of economic p h ? "  a .  
Sp-Xg it not clear that tbe theory of "the sptematic fd- I .  
h n t  of emnomic plans" is a theory advantageow to a .L 
the wreckem? -, 
19. We myst d e s q  and a t  aside the fourth rottes . .41 
t 4 e q  to the efkct that the-Stakbmov movement i s  the 
. '*f mtans for liquidation of wrecking. 
eorphas~inventedsoastodiwrtthtblolv . , 
h the wmzkem dth a nohe of chatter abut S W -  
'I 
3.' mv'wmkem and the S- umvemmt. 
* h his rrporr -de MoIotov quoted a whole num- 
' * b ~ ~ a f f a ~ t a w ~ p t o ~ h o w t h c ~ ~ ~ ) t s k y i t e s d  - *-; 
m-Trotskyite wreckers in the' Kunets and Don B d m  . 
&wed the ca&knce of our politidly mre1as ~ 0 1 3 ~  -- . .  
mk+ t~ptemthl ly  led the Stakhanm workers a dance, 
placed s p k a  in their wheels, so to speak, arti-y ' ' 
d a whde nmber of ob& preventing their 
1Iy and k l i y  swccdd in dbqpm , - , - 
uM thr s&ov e e r s  do alone if the way 
r 
! 
tmgtion was b e d  on by the in'& 
, let my, led u, a gap between the s l w y  . 
mevhg: prepatmy work of coal mining and dl h 
~ W d t h e w m k ?  . , - 1 
j . .  
Xs it p ~ t  dear that the W a n u v  movement iwlf k - . 
in- need'& our a p e  aid @nrst dl the various m- ' 4 "  '- 
-4-1 ;r 
& W o ~ W o f  -7 so a8 to s@ things on d ' .. - 3 b it nut c l b  h t  the rtrukk - z:- iquihtion, and tbc dning of . . . 
i s  the necaeq  mn&tim . - -:<: 
=4 - <.' ' - -:,,-*: - _ <  _ .. 3' 
-i. '., , : .,,-: : - \% . I . - - .  * - . - /. .;J -M 
a . .tkeorywtlle . . 
.- .. ., This M untrue, comrades. Oaly 
J -. iamt sach a theory. The 'Frdcflte 
dI gangsters of the pen who live by slandering the - 
a - working dass of the Soviet Union-arm't they reserve 
f ~ .  Trotskyism? 
' No, the rotten they that the Trotskyites are muster- 
_ ing their last forces must be cast aside. 
12. Finally, we must destroy and mt aside stiLl an- 
other rotten theory to the effect that since we Bolsheviks 
are many while the yeckers. are few; since we Bolsheviks 
bave the support of tern of millions of people while the 
Trotskyite wreckers can be numbered in tens and units, 
then we Bolsheviks mn afFmd to pay no attention to 
such a handful of wrders. 
This is incorrect, mmrades. This more than strange 
theory has been invented so as to bring solace to amain 
' 
of our leading comrade who have failed in their work 
by reason of their inability to mrry on a strugple against 
the wrecking, to lull their vigilance and to make it p a -  
sible for them to sleep in peace. 
It is, of course, true that +e Trotskyite wreckm have 
rhk support of isolated individuals, while the Bolsheviks 
have the support of tens of millions of people. But it 
by no meam follows from this that the wreqlcers are not 
able to infIict very serious damage on us. It d m .  nor at 
&I need a big number of people to do and to 
- cause damage. Tens of thousands of workers have to be 
, et to d to build a Dniepmmy, but it  requires npt 
more than a few dozen men to blow it up. S e v d  Red ' 
. A* mrpa may be necessary to win a battle during war. 
h e .  But it d y  nseds a few spies somewhere in the army 
headquarters or wen in a divisional staB to steal the plan 
of o p t i o n s  and p it on to the enemy for this gain to 
be lost. Thousands of p p k  are required to build a big I 
railway bridge, but a few people are suf6cient to blow 
. it up. Tm and hundreds of such examples wufd Ik 
quoted. 
Comequmtly, we must not wmfog ourselves with the 
z6 
£act that we are many, while they, the Trotskyite wreck- 
em, are few. 
W e  must bring about a sitt+tion where there i3 nor 
a single Trotskyite wrecker left in our ranks. 
This f how the matter stan& with the quation of 
how to liquidate the shortcomings in our work, common 
to all our organizations,. economic and Soviet adminis- 
, trative and Party. Such are the measurea nccesgary for 
. the liquidation of these shortcomings. 
As regards the Party organizations in particular and 
the defects in their work, the measures necessary to liqui- 
date khese shomodqy are stated in su5cient detdl in 
the draft resolution submitted for your cowideration. I' 
therefore think there is no need to enlarge here on thin 
aspect of the qutstim. 
I would like to say just a few words on the question 
of political training and raising the level of our Party 
cadres. 
I think that if we are able, if we succeed in giving 
ideologiml training to our Party c u k  from mp to 
bottom and steeling them politically so that they can 
find their bearings with ease in the internal and inter- 
national situation, if we s u d  in d i n g  of them fully 
mature Leninists and M d t s  mpab1e of wlving the 
questions of the leadership of the country without mak- 
ing serious misdes, then we mn thereby solve nine- 
tenths of dl our wb. 
How do things stand with regard to the leading forces, 
. of our Party? 
In our Party, if we have in mind its leading stram, 
, 
there are about 3,000 to 4,000 first rank ledera whom 
I would call our Party's corps of genmls. 
Then there are 30,000 to 40,000 middle rank I& 
who are our Party carpa of ofkers. 
Then there are about I00,000 to 150,000 of the l& 
a7 
P a q  d d  st& wha'are; so td a@, dirr 
P w ' s  -non-cmmbsioned o b .  - 
The task is to raise the ideo1ogicaf Ievel and pofirical 
vigor of these command cadres and to intraduce among 
&em k h  fo~a await* promotion, and thus e x p a  
the rank of our leading forus. . 
What dm this require? 
First and foremat, we musi make the propad to 
our Party leaders beginning with seaetarim of our Party 
units to the secretaries of regional and republimn Party 
organizations to select, during a defihite period, two in. 
dividuah, two Party functionaries each mpable of being 
able to act as their effective deputies. 
T h e  question may be asked: Where are we to get these 
two deputies for each one, if we have no such people, no 
workers who @ompond to these requirements? This is 
incorrect, comrades. We have tens of thousands of =pa- 
ble and talented people. It only needs to know them 
and to promote them in time so that they should not 
remain in tbcir old place too long and begin to rot. 
Seek and ye shall find. 
Further, four-month Party courses must be ~tablished 
in each regional center to give secretaries of units Party 
wining and to re-quip them, The secretaries of all 
pfirmy Party organizations (units) should be wnt to 
oh- courses and then when they finish them and return 
b e  their deputies and the mwt mbaple members of the, 
primary Party organizations should Ix =rib to these 
mutdes. - 
Further, to re-eqnip p l i t i a l l y  the h t  secretaria of 
- the district 'organizations, eighr-month Lenin chrses mm t 
&t atabliahed in .the U.S.S.R., in, say, ten of the m a t  
important centers. 
T h e  firat secretaria of dirt& bnd rrgialul' Pvty or- 
ganizattons should be sent to these, ctnrrseg, q d  thm 




ahd the most capable m t m b  of the d& md'qihfd ti^ 11 
organimtiom sent there. 
Further, &-month courses for the shdy of h&tmyllcffll 
the Party's policy under the C e d  Cwtmittee of the' 4 
Communist Party of the M e t  Union must be set 'up to - 
achieve the ideological 're-equipment and politid im- ' 
pmvement of secretaries of the town Party oqpr&tio= 
The fmt and second senetaria of town Partyn'org-- 
- 
tiom should be sent to these cpunes and then w h d  they - 
have hished them and return home the most capable 
members of the town Party organizations-should be sent 
there. 
Finally, a six-month confmence on qesestions of i n t e n d  
and i n t m t i m d  policy under the Central -tee 
of the C.P.S.U- must be established. 
The first metaria  of divisional and provincial or- - - 
ganhtions and the Central Committeesl of the 1~tior181 
Communist Parties should be tent here. These comrads . .- 
should provide not one but several pmom really capable 
of replacing the leaden of the Centd  Committee d 'our 
P q .  This should and rut be Qne. 
-1 mncIude, camrades. 
We have thus outbed the main defects in our work, ' - 
including base which are common to all our oqpmiza- ' 
tiom, economic, administrative and Party, and a h  those 
which are spdimlly peculiar to Party ~~ qnly ' - : 
- d e b  made wx of by the enemies of the working class . 
for tq& d i d o n i s t  and wrecking, @onqz and terrorist 
- work. - 
We have further outlined the chid meas- to be .' 
taken to render harmla  and liquidate the Bivemivef 
wrecking, espionage and t d t  -ula of the TroMyite . 
h & t  agcntrr of the foreign intelli&ncc s e r v i a .  . 
The question nrists: Can we carny 'through dl th* .. a 
measures, do we all the n-y pmsibiiitics &+ '
this? Undoubtedly we can. W e  m, because wi$ kw" ai 
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our d h p d  all the means necewaq for the rdiza~on 
of these measures. 
What do we lack? We lack d y  one thing: the mdi-  
neds -to liquidate our own deggnmu, our own wm- 
.placemy, our own political, shortsightednem. 
There is the rub. Cannot we who have overthrown 
apitakm, in the main built smialism, and raised aloft - the great banner of world mmmtmim, get rid of this 
.ridblous and idiotic disease? * 
We have no reawn to doubt &at we sball certainly 
get rid of it, given, of courseI that we will it. We will get 
rid of it, not just in an ordinary manner but in a Bolshevik 
fashion, in real EdShion. 
And when we get rid of this idiotic disease, we can say 
wi& complete confidenm that we fear no enemies from 
within or without, we fear npne of their assaults, for we 
a h d  shatter them in the future, as we- doing now and 
as' we have dqne in the p t .  
Concluding Speech 
- C  OMRADES I spoke in my report about the basic questions of the matter under discussion. The dis- 
cussion has shown that we now have complete clarity, 
have an understanding of our tasks, and that thcre k a 
 to liquidate the shortcominp of our work. But 
the dkmsion has d o  shown that there axe some concrete 
questions of our organizatiod-political practice on which 
we. have not as yet a completely clear understanding. 
Of tbeae qmsticws, I have counted seven. 
Allow me to say a few w& on these questions. 
I. I t  is to be suppdsed that all have now understood 
and have rdhed'that to b m e  excaively e n g r a d  
in economic rrtmpaigna and economic au- while 
&estimating and forgetting Party political prob1ems 
30 
, . leads up a blind alley. Consequently it is necewry to . 
turn the attention of our work- toward Party pliti* 
questions, g0 that wnomic successes will IE corlabined . 
with and accompany sruccqses in Party plitiml work. . 
How in practice is the task of strengthening the Party 
political work, the taark of freeing the Party organizations . 
from economic details to be carried out? As can be sea 
from the discussion, some comrades are prone to h w  
the incorrect mndusions that wC should now get away 
- altogether from economic work. At any rate, here were 
voices sounding this note: "Well, now, thank God, we 
shall be rid of economic matters, now we & busy our- 
selves with Party political work." 
Is this conclusion correct? No, it is not When our Party 
comrades, d e d '  away with economic successes, moved 
away from politim, this was an extreme which cast us big - 
. sacrifices. f f  some of our comrades, taking up the task of 
strengthening Party politiml work, now think d moving 
away fmm economy, this wIlI be the other extreme, 
' 
which will a t  us no fewer sacrifices. You must not jump 
from one extreme to another. You must not repate . 
politics horn economy, just as we cannot move away from 
politia. 
For convenience in study, people usually separate the 
methodobgid questions of economy h' the questions 
of politics. But this is done merely Erom the standpoint , 
of method, artikially, only for the convdence of stud?. 
But in Zife, on tbe contrary, nnd emnomy are in 0 
practice heparable. They exist together. Asd he who 
thinks to sepmte economy horn politia in our pracud 
policy, to strengthen economic work at the a t  of b 
li ttling political work or, contrariwise, to strengthen 
p I i t i d  work at the cost of belittling economic workr 
will inevitably find himself up a blind alley. I 
The particular' point in the draft rdution on the , 
* k i n g  of Party organizations from economic -Is a d  
3' 
the 8trengthdng of Party politid work does not mmn 
, moving away from economic work and economic l&- 
a p .  It means, simply, no longer to penqit the p c t k  
of .supplanting and usurping economic organs, among 
them especially agriculmnl orgaxls, by our Party organ- 
- izations. Cawquently, it is n v  to master the 
- d o d  of BoIshcvik leadership of ecmomic organs, 
- which lies in systematicrrlly helping these organs, sys- 
' - tematidIy strengrhening them and guiding economy, 
not over the heads of these organs but through them. 
The economic organs, and in the first place the agricul- 
r e  cqam, must be given the best people. 
These organs mwt receive fresh st&, consisting of 
the best workers apable of carrying out the tasks as- 
. signed to them. Only after this work has been done will i t  
be @ble to count on the Party organizations being 
compktely freed from economic detaih. This is a swious 
matter, of coum, and requires a certain length of time. 
But until it is done, the Party organizations, for a definite 
dprt period, Gill still have to ocdlipy themselva clawly 
. '  with agricultural Airs, with all their details: plowing, 
Pawing, harveting, etc. 
2. A few words about wreckers, divemionists, spies, etc. 
It b now clear for all, 1 think, that the present-day wreck- - and divemionists, no matter what flag they we to 
aver. themelm, the Trotskyite or the Bukharin flag, 
have long since ctased rn be a politid trend in the work- 
@ @kaw movement, that hey have turned into a gang of 
@ & o d  &em, diversionists, spie and murderers, 
- dew$ of prindplu qnd id- Of mum, these p d e -  
. mtnwill have to be smashed and mthlmly uprooted a 
manics of the working c h i ,  as traitors to our counw.' 
' This is clear and does not repuke further expIanation. 
.'.But here h the qumtion-how to c-arry out in p d e '  
' 
the &ask of s&ng and upmting the German-Jaw= 
wts o f  Troeskyhln. DOH this mean that, we. rhouM 
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mike and uproot mt d y  
those who wavered at !mine 
&& h * cttVle 
those who are realIy Trotskyite agents 
a h  those who happe 
a meet where some Tro 
At any wte, such qoices 
G n  we ctmsider such an interpretation of 
to be correct? No, we annot consider it to be aomea-- 
- -On this question, ars 
be an individual, differentiated approach. You m ~ t  4.- 
masure everyone with the m e  ymlrricl.  Such a -,$ 
hg approach can only harm the muse of struggle ag&h@ $ 
thk real Trotskyite wreckers and spia. - ' .* - - 
Among our ~ ~ b l e  mma& there are a ;A 
m b e r  of former Tmukyita who I& TmULyhm lw-:;,": 
ago, and now Gght a+t TrqMykm not wotse k$*''::-. 
b e t t e r ~ ~ o f 0 u r ~ ~ c o m r a d G o w h o ' n ~ " j .  
chanced to waver toward Trotskyism. 1t would be-tkolidh -,? 
m vilify such comrades now. . , # 7 2.3 -. 
Among our comradts there are also those who at-#' ., 
s t m i  @nst Tromk* idaologidly, but in @te a:?; 
this kept up pmmd contacu with individual Thtskyim, , : 
which they did not delay in- li@i&ting as goon a t h e  -'? 
actual visage of Tmskpism became dm to the. &-.-:. 
is. qE course, not a god that they did not brtrb;-'! 
O E  thtir pmana1 friendly m e t i o n s  with indhi&@:s 
to distribute Ebem 
This , m a  to se 
such cmcmtc work? 
This does not meam to convert a buineae-like approach 
into a "business man's" approach in which people are 
interested in the practid qualities of workers, but are 
. . not intemted in their political physiognomy, 
This doea not meaxl to convert a politid approach 
into the single and all-embracing approach in which 
p p 1 e  are m t e d  -in the political physiognomy crf 
workers, but are not interested in their practi-1 quali- 
fiatiorls. 
G m  it be said that this Bolshevik rule is cmied out 
by our Party comrades? Unfortunately, it canhot be said. 
It has already been spoken of here at the plenum. But 
not everything. was said. The fact is that this well-tried 
rule is violated right and left in our practice and, more- 
\ 
over, in the gnassest way. Mast frequently, workers are 
selected not amording to objective criteria, but accord- 
ing to accidental, subjective, narrow and provincial cri- 
teria. Most frequently so-cdled acquaintances are chosen, 
- pmonal friends, fellow bwmsmen, people who have 
shown pemnal devotion, mastetvl of dogies to their 
patrons, irrespective of whether they'are suitable from a ,  
p1iW and a bushes-like standpoint. 
Naturally, instead of a leading group of responsible 
I 
workers, a fitmily group, a company, is formedt the m m -  
bers of which try to live peacefully, not to offend each 
other, not to wash their dirty linen in public, to eulogize 
( each 0th- and from time to time to m d  inane and 
nauseating m p t s  to the center about successes. 
It is not difKcuIt to understand that in such conditibns 
. of kinship there mn be no place eifber for criticism of 
the shortcomings of the work, or Eor self-criticism try 
the leaders of the work. 
Naturally, snch.conditionrr of kinship mixate a favorable 
environment for generating bootlickers, p p l e  without 
any sense of d i e t y ,  and therefore having nothing in 




Take, for example, Comrades ~ i m *  and V.ioov. ' 
The h e r  is secretary of the regionu1 P t y  o e - '  
' 
'tion in Kazakstan; the latter b secretary of the Y-hv 
- Segional Party q p k t i o n .  These p"@e are not the f- mat backward worlcm in our midst. bm 
- select workers? TP- 
V" The former dragged along with him from Azer-baijat 
$ and the Urals, where he formerly worked, into KUJItps thirty or forty of his "own" people, and placed them in . 
responsible positions in Kazakstan. 
The latter dragged along with him from 'the Donbas, 
where he formerly worked, to Yamlav a dozen or so d 
his "own" people also, and also placed them in regpon- 
sible p i t i ~ n s .  Consequently, Comrade Mimyan h a  his 
own crew. Comrade Vainov also hiu his. 
W, Was it really i m p i b l e  to elect workers from the 
i'- l d  people, being guided by the wel l -knm BoMdk 
rule on the sdection and placing of people? Of course, 
L- , it was possible. Why *then did they not do lo? Brause 
the Bolshevik rule fox the selection of work& mlwh 
, the possibility of a narrow parochial approach, d u &  
- the possibility of workers being selected acmdkg t~ 
4 criteria of kinship and being "one of the gang." In d i -  
, tion, when selecting p d l y  devoted people as workers* 
, &ese comrades evidently haw wanted to create for hem 
selves conditions which give them a certain independence. 
! - ,, both of the l d  people anbof the Central Committee of 
' the Party. 
,, Let us suppose that Comrades Minoyan and Vainw, 
owing m lome circum~tancu or other, are ~~ 
P n  
- from their present place of work to some other p k .  
. How should they act in such a case regardin@ their - 1- 
"rails?'* Will they really have to drag them along oncc't 
- more to their new place of work? 
, This is the ahurdity resuIting from the viobtion of 
the Bolshevik rule on the correct selection and d h 5 b E t r .  
. .. . . 
4,- What dixs it mean-to verify workers, to cbqdi up 
t &a f d 8 I m a t  of mks? 
To ve&y wmkcrs means to check up nbt on rhdr 
prodm a* dedanhonh but on the result oE their 
-work. - 
To verify the fulfillment of tasks means to check up on 
- &em, not only-in the &ce and not only according to ~~~ rcparts, but k t  and k m a t  to &e& up on 
them at their pIace of work, according to the actual re- 
sults of fulfiUment. - 
J3o we need such a vdfmtion in general? Undoubtedly 
\ee do. W e  need it, in the fimt place, Bemuse only s d  
a & d - u p  will make it poasible to know a worker, 
ta detmmk his red qualities. We need It, in the second 
'- plact, because d y  such a verifimtion will make it p- 
' a l e  to dammine the god q d t i a  and shormminp 
of the cxecudw appntus. We need it, in the third place, 
-use only such a chec8-up will make it e b l e  to ' 
dctadne the good qualities and shortcamingn of h e  . 
mk8 thcmstlyes. 
Some comrada think that people an only be chdd 
up on from abovc, when the ledem check uji on ~ab- 
ordinates, on the 4. a£ their w&, q i s  & not tm. 
. Chd-up hum a h  b necexary, of mum, a9 one of 
the effective measures for verifging people and checkkg 
up the ibrJfdhent of tasks. But verifmrion from above 
W not axhawt by £ar the +hole businesd of wribtiolh. 
There ia still another &ind of verification, the &&-up 
,@nn &low, in which the m a a a  the subordinates, x e f i ~  
- . the hdm, pint out their *taka, and show the way 
.;- of m m d q  Ehem, This Lint3 of verification b one of the ' 
t mast M v e  hmh& of checking up on people. 
Tbe rankdPLd-6le memben v d £ y  their leaders at nkt- 
iw of active Party workers, at- cmkrams and can- 
.. - d, by iis-g to their repom, bp'dtiw defects, 
- 4. W l y  by electing or not dacting mm or'atker 
, .) leading comadm tD the leading Patty organa he& 
L o p e i x i t i o n o t d ~ c i c ~ m i n t h e P a r q ~ ~  - 1  
m d e d  by our Put? staturn, vncon&tiod c i-- nar of Pany organs, the right to put h a r d  and 
withdraw &didam, the secret Mlot and h@oim d. . 
L' ' aittcirrm and ~ ~ f ~ t i ~ d l l  that and dmiIar m- . . 
? hurt be d e d . i n t o  Lik, in order to facilitate the chedr- 1 
'T'' d-arid-file Party m e m h .  
t ,  :-. up on, ahd wnql over, the leaders of the Party lg b . ' 
k 
!. The non-Party mass- +check their economic, twle . 
k union and other Mcn at meetiq of nomfarty ad* I .. . workers, at all kinds of mas rjonferma, where they b m .  . --- 
repor. of.their leaden, criticire defects and i n & ~  ways. . 
: - of cofieGtjng them, Finally, the people c h d  1t;adirs .'. 
the country during the elactions to the Soviet Udcm 
f organs of power, through universal, equal,. d i m  a+ - 
5 +3 balbt. . -- r- The task is m link-up the check from above with 
f ' below* v .  
:- 5. What does it mean to train &dm on the 
$, their own misrakes? . 
ov-ng these dshkes. 
' -  - L&minsaid: . - .  
1 k 
The attitude of a polit& party 
taka is one of the m important 
thc micmmm of the party, and 
pPactic8, its obligations tow& ita 
of working people. To h i  
2 -&dose its mums, to a d  the c o n d i h  rise ~ b )  it, to study attenti y the meam d 
th- are tbe signs of a serious patty; this 
famawe of its dutia, Wa metm 
I 
This means &at the Bolsheviks are in duty bound not 
to glm over their mistakes, not to dm& &e question . 
of their mistah, as o h  happens with us, but hunatly 
and openly to admit theit mistakes, honestry and openly 
w H a t e  the way of mmeting h e  mistakes, hmadr 
and openly to correct them. 
man 
this businm with satisfaction. But, if the Bolahwika = z q  must fina su&cient 
madness in themseIves openly to admit their mistalr~,  
to reveal their causes, to indimte the way of d n g  
them, and thereby to give the Party -dm torsect train- 
ing and correct political education. 
For it is only on this path, only by open and honest 
-selfdticism, that Eulshevik -dm d y  a n  be edu- 
cated, that red Bolshevik leaders can be educated. * 
Two exampla will illusmate the comectnm of L&ds 
thesi8. 
&t w tnke, as one example, our mistakes connected 
with the building up of the coIlective farms. You remem- 
ber, X haghe, the year 1930, when our Party c o m h  . 
thought of solving the very c o m p l i d  question of trans- 
Sef f ing the pasantry to the building of collective farms 
in aome three to four months, and when the Central - 
Committee d the Party found itself compelled to put a 
check upon comrades who were being &ed away. Thk . 
was one of the most dangerous periods in the life of our 
Party. The mistatre lay in this: that our Party comrades 
hqot the voluntaq character of the building of collec- 
- tive farms, forgot that the peasants- must not be tram- 
fezred to the collective farm path by admhbtraaive - 
sure, hqpt that the budding of collective hms required 
not s e v d  months, but several years of mreEul and wen- . 
prannta work. 
They forpt d1 this, and did not want to dm& && 




of the Central Committee r e p d i q j  - 'w, and that our comrades in the I 
. leap ahead, ignoring the actual state 
with hostility. But this did not 
;; mictee from going against the stre 
5 - Party comrades onto the right road. 
c- 
I It is now dear to everybody th 
:I what it wanted by turning our Party comrade8 
j' right mad. We now have leru of thousands of 
i peasant cadra engaged in t 
farms, and in their leadership these cadres 
. wew trained on .the basis of the mistakes 
we would not now have had th 
=tq - 
Party then recognized these mis r- in dmc. 
! The other example i* from t 
$- stkuction. I have in mind our mistakes in the Shakhryl, 
' - arEecking perid Our mistakes lay in the fact that we a- 
! . not take into account all the d a n p  of tbe technkd :- ! backwudnesl of our ~ d m  in industry, &at we put up ;, 
' with this backwardness, and thought of developing-t .: -!. 
inaugrrial construction on a wide rale with the in imidy i  
',$ 
:; t h e p ~ o f p o o r c o m m i u v l ~ t b e ~ u q p i s s ~  . . , :; 
Yozl remember, I imagine, how pwilling our wnOD3ic :. 4 & .  ~dmwere~,mcognktheirmboLartlbrrlime;ba -7 
1 -. . unwillingly .they were 
>,.. badcwardnes$ and with 
the slogan "Master Techni 
"" b - to show that &he dogan 
r- &ts, and produced its g o d  
!: - Ind hundreds of thousands of '"'- fib - nomk cadres, who have already 
1 are advancing our indusrry. But 
, rbae cadres had the Party not 
- the face of tbe obduracy of the bugin 
not want to &it their l s h n i d  
39 3 .  . -. . & T ,  ; + "' . 
A 
. '  - . I. I .  . . - - . .  . - .  -.:fJ 9, 
. mt the Party then mmg&d its mistah and corrected 
: - &em in time, 
-' Some comrade say that it is not advisable to speak 
o p l p  of one's &takes, since the open admission of I one's mistaka may be construed by our enemiesi as weak- ness and may be utilized by thw. This is rubbish, comradesf downright rubbish. The t i p  rgmpiti011 of our mistaka and their honest &xi- flcation can, oa the contrary, onIy stm~gtben our Party, raise 'its authority in the eyes of the workers, peasants, working hintellectuals, and increase the strength and power-ofi our state. And this is the main thing. As long 
. as we have the workers, peasants and working i n t e l l e c d  
t d s  with us, all  the rest will settle iwlE 
Other comrades say- that the open admission of our. 
mistakes can lead, not to training and consolidating our 
- 4  c a b ,  but to weakening and disconcerting than; that 
we must spare and take care of our dm; that we must 
.their self-esteem and tranquility. To this end they 
/ -' propmi to slur over the of our comrades, to 
waken the vigor and the criticism and, still b e h ,  to. 
disregard thea mistakes. Such a line is not only fun&- & mentally -OW, *-, first bu a h  nd dangerous foremost, €or in the the highcst adra
- w 4 m  they want to "spare" and "take a r e  of." 
. To spare and p-we adred by slurring over their 
- _ -&taka meam certainty to ruin these very dm. W e  
W d y  have ruined our collectie farm Ebhhevik 
- - cab bad we liot revealed the m i a a a  of the year 19S& 
d had we not mined them on the hiis of thw mis. 
- ' t a b  We would certainty have ruined our industrial 
BoWevik cadres had we 'not revealed the mistaka of our 
mmradca in the Shakhty wrecking ptriod, and had we 
not dried our industrial d m  on the basis? 4 ' t h ~  * r i ~mistaka#le who expects to r p r e  the selfesteem of nr by slurring .over their mistaker both' thi d z a  and their self-esteem, for by alup@ng over theis 
'- 6. Lmin taught us not only to teach &e 
*to1earn-£rOmthm. - 
whit d m  this mean? 
- We members of the Party,.ra the voice of the 
'*'amall men," co the voice of the people. 
, tion whi&, homer, annot be done *out direct aid 
fmm thG masses. ' 
Third, to organize a check on the fulfillment of this 
decision-which, again, cannot be done without the direct 
aid of the masses. 
We leaders see things, events a d  p p I e  horn o m  
side only; I would say, from above. Our field of vision, 
consequently, is more or l a  limited. 
The nmws, on the contrary, see things, events and 
people from another side; I would say, from below. Their 
fieId of vision, consequently, is &o in a certain degree 
limited. T o  receive a correct solution ta the question 
.these two ex- must be unit& Only in such a 
case will the l eaddip  be correct. 
This is what it means not only to teach the mzuses, 
but also to learn from them. 
Two exampla to illustrate the c o m c t n ~ ~ ~  of this 
thesis of Lmin: 
It happe~ed several years ago, We members of the 
Central Committee had d i d  the question of im- 
proving the situation in the Don Basin. The draft of 
me;rsures presented by the People's Commissa&t of 
Heavy Industry wtas dearly unsatisfactory. The draft was 
murned to the People's Cornmhariat of Heavy Industry 
&me times. Three tima we received different drafts from 
' the People's Commissariat of Heavy Iqdustry. And still 
they couId not be considered satisfactory. Finally we de- 
cided to calI in several workers and pnk-and-He em- 
nornic and trade uni,on officials from the Don Basin, 
For three days we conversed with these m d e s .  And' 
all of us, members of the Central Committee, had to 
m o p h e  that only they, the rank-and-& workers, these 
"small people," had succeeded in providing us with a 
~~ludon. You remenzber, I imagine, the well- 
known decision of the CentraI Committee and the Coum 
dl of People's Coinmissan regarding the meas- for, 
h m s i n g  the output of coal in the Dm Basin. Well, this 
4s 
- dcmuon in the Kiev Party w g a n M I  
sf the leadem, U still, 
of the leadm m€Y$t lie 
And when is tb'h possible? 
It b p i b I e  only if the ladm are c l w l y  connected 
, with the maws, if they ate bound up with the Party 
I maws, with the working dass, with the peasantry, with 
the working intellectuals. 
: Contacts with the maspes, the strengthening of th- 
cdntacts, readiness to listen to the voice of the masses- 
! in ibt lie the strength and impregnability of BoIsheviK 
l t  may be talren'as a rule tbat so long as Bolsheviks*' 
keep contacts with the broad masses of the people, they 
will be invincible. And, contrariwise, it is suwent for 
Bolsheviks to bmk away from thc masses and lose con., 
tact with them. to become covered with bureaucratic 
verted into nonentitie. 
In the system of 'mythology of the mdwt Greeks' there 
was one Earnous hem Antaem, who, as mythoIogy de- 
clam, w the son of Pomidon, the W of the Sea, and 
Gaea, the C;nddess of the Earth* He was particu~1y.. 
a f t a d d  to his mother, who bore him, fed him ~d 
brought him up so that there was no h a  whom this 
Antaeus did not mnquish. He was considetea to be an 
* w e ,  and Withot~t measure, a p e  
of thousands &om the Party, 
But., only people who +iq essence are profoundly anti- 
Party GUY have su& an approach to members of the 
Pzrt y. 
As the result of such a heartless attitude toward people, 
toward Party m e m h  and Party workers, discontem 
and bittaness are +artificia!ly created in a section of the 
Party, while the Trotskyite doubledmlm adroitly seize 
bold of such embittered comrades and skillfully drag . them after themselves into the r n m  oE Trotskyite 
M i n g .  
The Trotskyites, by themselves, were never a big force 
in our Party. Call to mind the last discussion on Trotsky- 
ism in our Party in 1927. This was a genuine Party refer- 
endum. Out of 854,000 Party members, 730,000 mem- 
bers voted at chat time. Among them, 724,000 Party mem- 
bers voted for the BoIshevib, for the Central Committee 
of the P a q ,  against the Trotskyites, and 4,000 Party 
menhers, or about otlc-hlf of one p r  cent, voted for the 
Trotskyites, while 2,600 members of the Party refrained 
from voting. 
There were 123,000 memkrs who did n~t'.~articipate 
in the voting. They did not partidpate either b u s c t  
+they were away from home, or because their shift was at 
work when tbe vote was taken. If, to the 4,000 *o votd 
for & Trotskyites, we add dl those who refrained Erom 
votihg, on the assumption that they ;ilso sympathized 
with the Trotskyites, and if to this total we add, not one- 
half of one per cent of those who did not take part in the 
voting-as should be done by right-but five per cent of 
thae who did nut participate-that is, a b u t  6,000 Party 
memberswe obtain about 18,000 Party members who 
sympathized with Trotskyism to some -t or ocher. 
Here you see the total forces of the Trotskyite gendemen. 
Add to this the £act. that many out of tb nnmbtr 
became disillusioned with Trotsk* and Wt it, and 
you get a conception of the ~ g n i f i ~  of the Trotslry- 
ite form. And if, in spite of this, the Trotskyite w@m 
46 
373% 
, . /T --.-- , 
< ..* ' 
everthela have sume reewes or other m d  OW ' - 
* Party, it is b y e  the incorrect policy bf k m t  d our, - 
comrades on the question of expulsion Erom the Party 
and reinstatement of expelled people, the Beardas a t t i  
tude of some of Our comrades toward the fate of inbi- . ' 
- artificially engender a number of discontented and em- 
bittered people, and thus create these m e a  for the 
A large number are &pelled for d e d  p i i v i t y .  
What is p i u i t y ?  It is considered, we d h ~ ~ ~ r ,  that if 
- a member of the Party has not wtered the Party pro- - . 
gram, he is "passive," and due for expulsion. But thk is t 
ilot right, comrades. The statutes of our Party m o t  be 
iaterpxeted w pedantically. To master the Party p m  
p n  one d to be a real Marxist, a t e t d  and thee 
&.-, w-ly trained Mamist. 1 do not know whether marfp 
Y ;cLr-&rtp membm will be found by us in the Party who have 1 
k'- w y  martnrd our pmgnm, have become geniine - -  
. Marxists, theoretially mined and tried. If we were to . . 
p hszher along this path, we should have to leave only 
&elleads and learned people in general in the Party. ,- 
' . W o  wants such a Party? W e  have the M i s t  formula 3 . 
abut  Party membership which is verified, has stood dl . *.- 
tan. According to this formula, a Party member is one , 't : who' uccepk the Party program, pays m e m h f i p  dua 
and works in one of its organizations. 
Note that Lenin's formula daes not speak about mas- 
, .&ring the program, but of accepting the proprn. Thew 
-are two entirely -rent things. There b no need to 
prove Lenia waa right here and not our Pwty comradw 
who vainly mouthed about mastering the program. It is 
, obvious by itself. If the Party. took the stmdpoint that 
Party memkrs can be only those comrades who haye 
..& already mastered the program and have become 
i . 
retically trained Marxists, it would not have fad, 
thousands of Party circles in the Party, h u n d d s  & 
I 
party schools whee chc Party m e m h  art.tau@t U 
h and are helped to master our pn)gtam. It is q d ~  , 
dear that if the Party organizes d o o h  and circle among 
the Party m e m h ,  it-is kcawe it hpws  that the Party 
m e m h  have not yet succeeded in mastering the Pahy 
phgnm, have not yet succeeded in b d g  theoretidy 
trained Marxists: 
I : Consequently, to cxlrrect-our policy on the quation of 
membership of the Party and expulsion from the Party, 
. ' it is necewq to put an end to the pmmt b I d h d  
iriterpmtation of the question of passivity. ' 
But we have still another error in this field. T h e  kt 
is that our comrades do not recognize the mean between 
extremes. Ie i s  sufficient for a wotker, a Party me- 
ber, to commit some d l  o h ,  to be hte two or 
thxee times at a Party meeting, not to pay membership 
dues for some or other, and ih a h h  he is thrown 
out, of the Party. 
. N o  i n m t  ij taken in the degree of bis dense, the 
awie of his nonapprance at the meeting, the muse 
of the non-payment of membership dues. The b m u -  
m c y  of this is simply unparalleled. It is not d i M t  to 
understand that, pmxkly as the resuIt of such a heartless . 
policy, splendid skilled workers, excellent Stakhanovite, ,- 
have been thrown out of the Party. And was it @p 
sible, hefore expelling them born the Party, to give a 
4% and if this bad no effect, to censure than, or 
' 
. . admmm a reprimaad, and, if this had no effect, to set 
a period 6 mbmation, or in the extrcme m e  to redue 
so the pition of a adidate, but not -1 them with 
a sweep of the hand h m  the Party? 
Of course it was possible. 
- But this requim an attentive attitude to people, to . 
the Party members, to the ha of Party membership, And 
thia is exactly what v e  of our comada lack. 
It js high t h e  to put a stop to this ont&ous pra& 
' coinrades, 
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